This paper presents a new type of signature, contract digital signature, based on Discrete Logarithm(DL) and Elliptic Curve(EC) cryptosystems. Contract signature is similar to a real-life contract. No less than two signers take part in a contract signature. After introducing the concept and definition of contract signature, a scheme based on Discrete Logarithm (DL) and Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptosystems is presented. This scheme allows signers, whose ordinary signature schemes use many different cryptographic systems, to generate a single signature. The scheme requires neither a trusted arbitrator nor a high degree of interaction between signers. We then prove that this scheme is secure under the discrete logarithm assumption.
INTRODUCTION
Digital signature (Rivest et al., 1978 ) is one of the major means for authentication, and also one of the major research subjects of modern cryptography. Digital signature is the digital equivalent of hand signature, whose major functionality is to achieve user's authentication of a digital message. It is playing an increasingly important role in building e-commerce and office automation. Digital signature has also gained extensive interest due to its being utilized in governmental agencies and internal operations of enterprises.
A variety of digital signatures have been proposed, such as multisignature (Okamoto, 1988) (Ohta and Okamoto, 1991) , proxy signature (Mambo et al., 1996) , proxy multisignature (Xiaoming et al., 2002) (Lian-hai and Qiu-liang, 2004) , and threshold digital signature (Park and Kurosawa, 1996) . However, to date there has been no digital signature which simulates a real-life contract. In real-life, two or more signers, who may be from different companies, participate in a contract. Such contracts play a very important role in various economic activities, so it is necessary to propose a kind of signature that is similar to a real-life contract, with the following characteristics:
(1) In its generation, this kind of signature uses the signer's public key and private key of ordinary signature, making it more practical than other signature types.
(2) Signers may use different parameters or cryptosystems. This is different from the multisignature (Okamoto, 1988 ) (Ohta and Okamoto, 1991) proposed by Okamoto, which uses the same parameters in same cryptosystem.
(3) Fairness in the signing process: In the signing process, if one signer can't obtain the signature, the others also can't obtain the signature This kind of signature is the digital equivalent of contracts and can be named "Contract Signature". It can be easily distinguished from multisignature, which use parameters in the same cryptosystem and seldom considers fairness in the signing process. It can also be distinguished from the "private contract signature" used in a contract signing protocol or concurrent signature. This latter type of signature resolves the problem of fair exchange of signatures, but contract signature does that with a single signature in a collaborative and simultaneous manner.
Furthermore, contract signature does not have the drawback of data expansion with the number of signers, which is more similar to a real-life contract. Moreover, in some applications, co-signers may be associated with different roles/ positions and, therefore, have different management liabilities and authorization capabilities. Thus, contract signatures generated by co-signers with different signing orders often imply different meanings (In this case, it is not necessary to consider fairness of signature generation). Contract signature also suits well to joint announcement between different governments, ministries, and enterprises. So it can be used more widely than signing protocols and concurrent signatures.
Related Work
There are many real-life situation where multiple signers need to sign the same message. A simple solution is that every signer sign the message using an ordinary signature scheme. But this has the drawback that the data increases with the number of signers. A multisignature (Okamoto, 1988) (Ohta and Okamoto, 1991) scheme , whose goal is to design a signature scheme without data expansion with the number of signers, is a digital signature scheme that allows multiple signers to generate a single signature in a collaborative and simultaneous manner. Moreover, in some applications, co-signers in a signing group may be associated with different roles/ positions and, therefore, have different management liabilities and authorization capabilities. Thus, multisignatures generated by the same group of co-signers with different signing orders often imply different meanings.
At the same time, as more business is conducted over the Internet, the fair exchange problem assumes an increasing importance. Early work on solving this problem was based on the idea of timed release or timed fair exchange of signatures [8, 9, 10, 11] . Here, the two parties sign their respective messages and exchange their signatures "little-by-little" using a protocol. Typically, such protocols are highly interactive with many message flows. An alternative approach to solving the problem of fair exchange of signatures involves the use of a (semi-trusted) third party or arbitrator T who can be called upon to handle disputes between signers. The idea is that A registers her public key with T in a one-time registration, and thereafter may perform many fair exchanges with other entities. To take part in a fair exchange with B , A creates a partial signature which she sends to B . Entity B can be convinced that the partial signature is valid (perhaps via a protocol interaction with A ) and that T can extract a full, binding signature from the partial signature. However, the partial signature on its own is not binding for A . B then fulfils his commitment by sending A his signature, and if valid, A releases the full version of her signature to B .
This protocol is fair since if B does not sign, then A 's partial signature is worthless to B , and if B does sign but A refuses to release her full signature, then B can obtain it from T . The third party is only required in case of dispute; for this reason, protocols of this type are commonly referred to as optimistic fair exchange protocols.
The main problem with such an approach is the requirement for a dispute-resolving third party with functions beyond those required of a normal Certification Authority. In general, appropriate third parties may not be available.
Concurrent signatures (Chen et al., 2004 ) and concurrent signature protocols are also proposed to solve this problem. In a concurrent signature protocol, two parties A and B can interact without the help of a third party to sign (possibly identical) messages A M and B M in such a way that both A and B become publicly committed to their respective messages at the same moment in time (i.e., concurrently). This moment is determined by one of the parties through the release of an extra piece of information k which is called a keystone. Before the keystone's release, neither party is publicly committed through their signatures, while after this point, both are. In fact, from a third party's point of view, before the keystone is released, both parties could have produced both signatures, so the signatures are completely ambiguous. In a concurrent signature scheme, A first generates a keystone k and sends k to B . A and B each generate ambiguous signatures A σ and B σ , which are similar to ring signatures (Rivest et al., 2001) , in which an anonymous signer A wants to have the option of later proving his authorship of a ring signature. The solution was to choose bits B h pseudo-randomly and later to reveal the seed used to generate B h . In a concurrent signature scheme, before k is released, it can't be assured that A σ is signed by A, and it can't be assured that B σ is signed by B . These assurances become possible when k is released. But these concurrent signatures have the drawback that the data expansion increases with the number of signers, and also do not adapt to the cases of joint announcement between different governments, ministries, and enterprises. Moreover, A may hide k and want to publicize it when the contract signature is of benefit to him. In this sense, the protocol is not fair.
Our Contributions
We introduce the notion of contract signature. A contract signature scheme allows multiple signers, who may be from different companies and may use different parameters or cryptosystems, to generate a single signature in a collaborative and simultaneous manner. Signers They use the same public key and private key as in their ordinary signature. This makes the management of public key or digital ID easier, and make contract signatures more practical than multisignatures. In the following sections, the paper presents a contract signature scheme based on Discrete Logarithm (DL) and Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptosystems. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) This scheme resolves the problem of signers, whose ordinary signature scheme use different cryptographic systems from each other, generating a single signature. This is a major question that should be resolved in each contract signature. In the scheme described here, there are two signers, one's ordinary signature scheme is based on Discrete Logarithm(DL), and the other's scheme is based on Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptosystem. They can generate a secure contract signature.
(2) In this signature generating process, if one side can't obtain the signature, the others can't obtain the signature either. We use a keystone, similar to concurrent signatures, and set up a time limit, to resolve the fairness property of generation, without requiring a trusted third party.
(3) The scheme is secure: we prove that it is secure under the discrete logarithm assumption and ECCDH(Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman) assumption.
In Section 2 we provide the formal definition of a contract signature and its properties. In Section 3 we present a contract signature scheme based on DL and EC cryptosystems, and prove the correctness of the scheme. In Section 4 we analyze the scheme's security.
DEFINITION OF CONTRACT SIGNATURE

Description
Assume that n signers take part in the signing process, and Signer ( , , , , ) P A K S V , and satisfies the following proprieties:
(1) P is a finite set of messages (2) A is a finite set of signatures (3) 1 2 ( , ,..., ) 
Basic Characteristics
Following are the characteristics of a contract signature Basic Security: In the process of signature generation, any information broadcast by signer i is useless for others to compute the private key of signer i . That is, any broadcast information does not affect the security of private key or ordinary signature of signer i . Unforgeability: If signer i does not take part in the process of signature generation, no one can counterfeit his contract signature. In the generation process of contract signature, the scheme should be secure even though other i-1 signers conspire to forge the contract signature of signer i .
Undeniability:
Once having generated a contract signature with proxy, none of the signers can deny it.
Fairness: In the signing process, if one can't obtain the signature, the others can't obtain the signature either.
Key-dependence: The signature key for a contract signature generator depends on each corresponding signer's private key which was used by the signer to generate an ordinary signature.
CONTRACT SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON DL AND EC CRYPTOSYSTEM
A contract signature generation may involve different parameters and different cryptosystems. As a result, a contract signature scheme is comparatively more complicated than other types of signature. Here, we study a simple form described below. In later research, we will discuss other complex forms.
In the case studier here, only two signers participate in a digital contract generation, where their digital signature schemes are based on Discrete Logarithm (DL) or Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptosystems.
Parameters
Let the two signers be A and B .
A 's Parameters
A 's ordinary signature parameters are the following: 1 p is a large prime, an elliptic curve
∈ is a finite point of prime order in 1 ( ) GF q . It can be presented as follows: 
Common Parameters
h is a hash functions; Let the message for signature be 1 m
Generation
STEP1: A does the following: R r s f will be blanked out within a day, and sends his ordinary signature to others signers.
The interactions between A and B are shown in Figure 1 
Verification
When m and ( , , , ) R r s f are received by us, we first compute 1 t from m, and check whether B has announced that this signature has been blanked out before 1 t +1 day. If yes, the verification fails.
Then we check whether R is a point on 1 E . If not, the verification fails.
We use the following equations to validate whether ( , , , ) R r s f is a contract signature of m :
If the above equations hold, then accept the contract signature.
Correctness
In this subsection we prove the correctness of the procedure. 
Proof that Equations
R r G s R r G f h m d r k R r G f h m d G r k R r G f h m d R r
Proof that Verification Equation Works
To prove that verification works, we must prove that equation (3.5) and (3.6) work. First we prove that equation ( 
) ( 1) ( ( ( )
) ( 1)( 1) mod ( Next, we prove that equation （3.6） works. ( 1) ( ( ( )) ) ( 1) ( ( ( )) ) ( 1)mod mod ( 1) ( 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
We will discuss the security of our scheme under Discrete Logarithm Assumption and ECCDH Assumption.
Security Characteristics of the Scheme
We will prove that this scheme is secure under the Discrete Logarithm Assumption and ECCDH Assumption.
Basic Security
We have proved that in this scheme, signer A and
s under the computational discrete logarithm assumption and ECCDH assumption. The proof is rather long, and omitted due to space limitation.
Nonfakability
We have proved that the scheme is secure under outsider impersonation attacks, insider impersonation attacks, and Man-in-the-middle attack. The proof is rather long, and omitted due to space limitation..
Fairness
In a contract signature, fairness is very important. In our signature scheme, if one can't obtain the signature, the others also can't obtain the signature. ( , , , ) R r s f has been blanked out within a day and sends his ordinary signature to others signers. If A didn't send k to B before time 1 t , then ( , , , ) R r s f will be blanked out.
If a few days later B regrets having signed the contract, he want to public his ordinary signature which announces that ( , , , ) R r s f has been blanked out. But because A has publicized k , or one day has passed, his ordinary signature which announce that ( , , , ) R r s f have been blanked out is valid. So our scheme is fair. 
Nonrepudiation
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented a new type of signature: contract digital signature scheme based DL and EC Cryptosystems. The scheme resolved the problem of how signers whose ordinary signature schemes use different cryptographic systems, generate a single signature. The scheme requires neither a trusted arbitrator nor a high degree of interaction between signers. We believe that contract signatures can be used more widely than signing protocols and concurrent signatures. The scheme presented here is only a simple form of contract signature. There are many more related problems for further study, such as the multi-party contract signature scheme, contract signature scheme based on RSA and DL Cryptosystems, and contract signature scheme based on RSA, DL, and EC Cryptosystems.
